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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY:  
THREE PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE THE  
NATIONWIDE POPULAR VOTE IN  
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS  
Alexander S. Belenky* † 
Introduction 
The idea of reforming the Electoral College recurs each time a presiden-
tial election nears. Polls show that an overwhelming majority of respondents 
support abolishing the Electoral College in favor of direct popular election 
of the President. Yet, it is doubtful whether these polls really imply that such 
a move would be best for the country. Despite the seeming simplicity of 
direct popular presidential election, its introduction in the United States—a 
country in which the clear separation of powers between the states and the 
federal government has existed for more than two centuries—would have 
hidden drawbacks that the media and pollsters usually fail to communicate. 
Further, the existing Electoral College-based system of electing a President 
is complicated, and the simplistic media coverage of American social and 
political phenomena fails to educate voters about the nuances of that system. 
Thus, pollsters are asking people whether they favor replacing the Electoral 
College, a system that many respondents don’t sufficiently understand, with 
direct popular election, a system that many respondents also don’t necessar-
ily understand.  
Since the 2000 election, a dozen electoral reform proposals have been 
discussed both in the scientific community and in the media. Five proposals 
have received particular attention. I discussed two of them—one introducing 
a Maine-like district scheme and the other introducing a proportional 
scheme of awarding state electoral votes both in some states and nation-
wide—in my recent editorial in the Baltimore Sun, “District Vote Proposal 
Falls Short.” This Commentary explores the other three proposals, which 
are concerned with introducing the nationwide popular vote into presidential 
elections. 
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analysis and applied mathematics; author of Extreme Outcomes of US Presidential Elections, Win-
ning the US Presidency: Rules of the Game and Playing by the Rules, and How America Chooses Its 
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entitled “Mathematical Modeling of Voting Systems and Elections: Theory and Applications.” 
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Since space limitations prevent a detailed analysis of the proposals un-
der consideration here, this Commentary offers only a kind of a snapshot of 
the basic ideas underlying each proposal, along with the inevitable negative 
consequences of adopting two of the proposals. I don’t discuss how the 
technical problems associated with counting every vote under direct popular 
elections—for instance, voter registration fraud, long lines, and voting ma-
chine glitches—might compare to those under the existing election system. 
Whatever these problems may be, the quality of services in administering 
elections shouldn’t be a factor in choosing a particular scheme for electing a 
President.  
New election rules that I first proposed in Extreme Outcomes of US 
Presidential Elections and (in a particular form) in How America Chooses 
Its Presidents would encourage the country to elect a President with a man-
date from both the nation and the individual states as equal members of the 
Union. Under these rules, the nationwide popular vote would be a decisive 
factor in choosing the President, while the existing Electoral College-based 
system would be preserved as a backup. Also under these rules, all the states 
would gain the attention of presidential candidates while retaining the bene-
fits of the Electoral College. 
Though I have my own preferences regarding the three proposals I dis-
cuss in this Commentary, readers should decide for themselves which 
proposal merits which of the three labels that the title of this Commentary 
borrows from Sergio Leone’s famous movie. 
I. Direct Popular Election of a President 
Implementing a direct popular election system—which has been pro-
posed many times but always without sufficient support in Congress to 
initiate a constitutional amendment—would require revolutionary changes 
in the American political system.  
First, American voters would acquire a constitutionally guaranteed right 
to vote for President. Currently, the participation of Americans in presiden-
tial elections—even voting for presidential electors—isn’t constitutionally 
guaranteed. Appointing electors by state popular vote is no more than a par-
ticular manner of appointing state electors. Constitutionally, state 
legislatures can replace this particular manner with any other manner of ap-
pointing state electors, as the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Bush v. Gore in 
2000.  
Second, introducing this election system would likely invite multi-
candidate presidential elections in the United States. Three factors—a po-
tentially favorable electorate, an appeal to targeted voters, and financial 
resources—are crucial for non-major party candidates to emerge, and all of 
these factors look favorably upon the appearance of such candidates in di-
rect popular presidential elections. 
A sizable majority of eligible voters are, in fact, up for grabs in presi-
dential elections, particularly, for non-major party candidates. Almost 
forty-five percent of all eligible voters usually do not vote in presidential 
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elections, at least ten percent of the electorate are swing voters, and more 
and more registered Republicans and Democrats call themselves independ-
ent. Also, under direct popular election, the constitutionally guaranteed right 
to vote for President would shift the burden of voter registration to the fed-
eral government and would eliminate many currently existing obstacles to 
voting in presidential elections. The winner-take-all rule would not waste 
votes cast for the losers in state presidential contests—as it does under the 
existing election rules. All this would contribute to encouraging people who 
are currently non-voters to vote. 
In 1992, Ross Perot captured almost 19% of the 55% voter turnout, i.e. 
more than 10% of the whole electorate (more precisely, the voting-age 
population), even without any special appeal to non-voters and despite the 
manner in which his campaign was conducted. If only half of current non-
voters voted in presidential elections, they would make the group of voters 
potentially favorable to non-major party candidates comparable in size to 
the group of voters favorable to either of the major party candidates. Since 
the major parties do not currently seem to represent non-voters in presiden-
tial elections, there is plenty of room for non-major party candidates to 
appeal to both non-voters and swing voters. 
Financial problems for appealing non-major party candidates also look 
solvable. For example, the Internet has proven effective in fundraising for 
presidential hopefuls who appeal to particular factions of voters and in or-
ganizing concerned voters. Also, self-financed political figures interested in 
running as non-major party candidates are widely perceived by Americans 
as independent of any particular sponsors.  
If multi-candidate elections with competitive non-major party candidates 
become a reality, a particular scheme for conducting multi-candidate direct 
presidential elections in the country should be chosen. The two most-
employed schemes—which are based on the simple rule “choose one candi-
date only”—are (a) one-round elections with a popular vote plurality 
winner; and (b) two-round elections with a popular majority winner and, if 
no candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round, a runoff between 
the top two recipients of votes.  
In such a politically divided country as the United States, under the first 
scheme multi-candidate elections with several candidates appealing to large 
factions of voters may eventually produce an election winner with less than 
30% of all votes. Would the United States accept a President who more than 
70% of the electorate had not chosen? In many countries employing the 
second scheme, it is common for no candidate to receive a majority of votes 
in the first round and for the turnout for runoff elections to be much less 
than 50% of the eligible voters. If, say, less than 40% of all eligible voters 
cast ballots in a U.S. runoff, would Americans accept a President finally 
elected by, say, only 20% of all eligible voters?  
Though there exist schemes of choosing an election winner that over-
come many deficiencies of the “choose one candidate only” rule in 
reflecting the wishes of voters, their introduction into possible multi-
candidate direct popular presidential elections in the United States (at least 
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currently) could be problematic. This is especially true taking into account 
that Americans have never had either a right or a chance to choose a Presi-
dent directly, even under this simple rule. 
Third, many Americans may feel that the introduction of direct popular 
presidential election would weaken the federal system of government, be-
cause an elected President may not have a mandate from the states, even in 
the form currently provided by the Electoral College. Moreover, movements 
supporting non-major party presidential candidates at times may result in 
the emergence of new strong political parties, and many Americans be-
lieve that a multi-party political system would destabilize the country. 
In the United States today, the majority of the population resides in the 
largest eleven states. As a result, candidates in direct popular presidential 
elections would likely campaign mainly in large, urban areas. Sparsely 
populated rural states would likely be ignored by major party candidates. 
Admittedly, many of these states are ignored by candidates even under the 
existing election system; but sparsely populated states may eventually have 
a say in the current Electoral College, especially in close elections. Cur-
rently, if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes, the election will 
be thrown into the House of Representatives, where each of the fifty states 
casts an equal, singular vote—regardless of the size of its population—due 
to the one state, one vote constitutional principle. Nothing even close to this 
would exist for small states in any direct popular presidential elections.  
As a result, each of the seventeen states with five or fewer electoral 
votes is unlikely to surrender what it is currently entitled to under the exist-
ing election system by supporting a constitutional amendment introducing 
direct popular elections. Nor would this amendment likely garner support 
from current medium-sized battleground states—which draw a great deal of 
attention in election campaigns under the Electoral College. In any direct 
popular election, these medium-sized states would have to compete with 
large, densely popular states for even less attention of the candidates than 
they currently enjoy. 
II. The National Popular Vote Plan
In the aftermath of the 2000 election, Robert Bennett, a prominent con-
stitutional lawyer, proposed an idea designed to effectuate the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of state legislatures to choose presidential 
electors in any manner they want, making it theoretically possible to cir-
cumvent the resistance of small states to direct popular presidential 
elections. This idea, described in Bennett’s book Taming the Electoral Col-
lege, was later reinvented by John Koza, a prominent computer scientist, and 
developed into the National Popular Vote plan described in the book Every 
Vote Equal. In its current form, the National Popular Vote plan involves as-
sembling a compact of states that together control at least 270 electoral 
votes. The signatory states’ legislatures would agree to award state electoral 
votes to the winner of the nationwide popular vote plurality, no matter how 
each of their own states voted.  
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If a sufficient number of states adopt the interstate compact, the plan is 
likely to face a constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court may conclude 
that while each state legislature is free to choose a manner of appointing 
state electors, a group of state legislatures cannot de facto introduce a new 
system of electing a President without an amendment to the Constitution—
particularly over the objection of at least one-fourth of the members of the 
Union.  
The plan strikes at the heart of the 1787 Great Compromise, which the 
Founding Fathers reached to keep the states together as a nation. The words 
of Delaware’s Gunning Bedford, Jr., to delegates from large states at the 
1787 Constitutional Convention—“I do not, gentlemen, trust you”—in dis-
cussing principles of state representation in Congress serve as a reminder 
about tension between the small and large states in reaching the compro-
mise. At the Convention, large states pledged to honor (a) the Electoral 
College, an “intermediate, independent Congress” with numbers of electoral 
votes for small states disproportionate to the size of their population, and (b) 
the one state, one vote principle both in electing a President in the House of 
Representatives and in amending the Constitution.  
Today, however, the fifty states and the District of Columbia (D.C.)—
rather than a college of presidential electors—choose the President. This 
happens due to the winner-take-all rule coupled with the widely implied 
(though not constitutionally required) obligation of presidential electors 
to follow the will of the appointing power (based on the state popular 
vote in forty-eight states and in D.C. and on the popular vote within each 
congressional district in Maine and Nebraska). This appears to violate the 
one state, one vote principle of electing a President by states, since a state’s 
quota of electoral votes is based on the size of its population. Moreover, 
constitutionally, the states are to elect a President through the House of 
Representatives only when the Electoral College fails to do so, i.e., when no 
candidate receives a majority of votes from all the appointed electors. In 
addition, adopting the winner-take-all rule of awarding state electoral votes, 
currently employed by forty-eight states and by D.C., has contributed to 
dividing the country into two parts during election campaigns. Candidates 
from the two major parties feel “safe” in a majority of states while the elec-
toral battles take place in a remaining minority of states. As happened in 
1992, 1996, and 2000, a third-party candidate may affect the election out-
come by influencing electoral votes in key battleground states, and in close 
elections the existing election rules may produce an outcome contrary to the 
nationwide popular will.  
But all this doesn’t mean that the circumvention of a substantial number 
of states—signaling that the value of the Great Compromise with respect to 
electing a President is no longer honored by the signatory states—can be 
justified. 
Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in 
which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the 
popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D.C. If all of the 
states and D.C. were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in 
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such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters 
choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan). 
Would the United States accept a President who wasn’t the choice of sixty-
six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? Also, this 
proposal could create the appearance of “faithless” electors in the states 
forming the compact. These electors may decide not to follow the nation-
wide popular vote if it goes against the will of the voters of their states. 
Finally, implementing this plan would still not provide the electorate with 
any constitutionally guaranteed right to vote in presidential elections, even 
for presidential electors. 
III. Election Rules Making the Nationwide Popular Vote a
Decisive Factor in Electing a President but Retaining the 
Electoral College 
The new election rules I have proposed would name as President the re-
cipient of a majority of the nationwide popular vote and of the popular vote 
majorities in at least twenty-six states (or in twenty-five states and D.C.) as 
long as a majority of all eligible voters cast ballots in the election. This 
would be true even if another candidate won the Electoral College. Only if 
no candidate achieved the required majorities would the winner of at least 
270 electoral votes—automatically awarded by the states and D.C. in the 
manners chosen by their legislatures—become the next President. If no can-
didate won at least 270 electoral votes either, then the proposed election 
rules would require the House of Representatives to choose a President, as 
the Twelfth Amendment directs.  
When more than fifty percent of all eligible voters don’t vote, choosing 
a President by the nationwide popular vote seems illogical. In such cases, 
either a majority of voters don’t care, or they believe that the candidates 
do not deserve their votes. It this were the case, as described above, the 
Electoral College and, if necessary, the House of Representatives, should 
step in as protective mechanisms—backups guaranteeing that a President is 
elected (or selected) as a result of the election (though, currently, the exis-
tence of such a guarantee can be questioned, as How America Chooses Its 
Presidents argues). The Founding Fathers might have seen these two elec-
tion mechanisms as protecting against a failure to elect a President, even if 
the popular will would not be expressed or a popular consensus could not be 
reached.  
Of course, any state may decide that a plurality of the statewide popular 
vote is sufficient to carry the state. Also, if the number of voters casting bal-
lots in a state is too small to award state electoral votes based on the 
statewide popular vote, the state legislature should retain the right to appoint 
electors to the Electoral College. 
These new election rules, first proposed in my books Extreme Outcomes 
of US Presidential Elections and (in a particular form) How America 
Chooses Its Presidents, are easy to understand by using three conceptions of 
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the U.S. Presidency. First, a candidate who wins a nationwide popular vote 
majority is a “President of the people.” Second, a candidate who achieves a 
majority in each of at least 26 states (or in 25 states and D.C.) is a “Presi-
dent of the states.” Third, a candidate who achieves a majority of votes from 
all the appointed electors is a “President of an electoral majority in the Elec-
toral College”—a compromise candidate in the sense of the Great 
Compromise. 
A candidate who garners two kinds of the voter majorities—both the na-
tionwide and the statewide majorities in 26 states or in 25 states and 
D.C.—is both a “President of the people” and a “President of the states.” 
This candidate would become the next President, even if another candidate 
became the “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College.” If 
no candidate is both a “President of the people” and a “President of the 
states,” then the existing rules would apply, such that the Electoral College 
or, if necessary, the House of Representatives would have to choose the next 
President. 
These rules would not destroy the existing system or any of its parts. 
Rather, they would build on the current system by potentially offering up a 
candidate whom society would perceive as better than the “compromise” 
candidate. These rules substantially differ from the Federal System Plan of 
1970, and they address federalist concerns in the strongest form, since the 
one state, one vote principle matters in an attempt to directly elect a Presi-
dent by the nation as a whole. 
Certainly, only a national dialogue may detect whether a compromise 
candidate—a “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College”—
is perceived by Americans as a better choice for the country than a candidate 
who is both a President of the people and a President of the states. If this 
were the case, there would be no need to implement the proposed new rules, 
despite all the well-known deficiencies of the existing election system. 
The proposed rules would encourage major party candidates to actively 
campaign in all states, regardless of size. These candidates are likely to com-
pete in all large states to win a nationwide popular majority and in small states 
to seek to win in at least twenty-six states. Both candidates are likely to com-
pete in medium-sized states as well, especially in the “battleground” ones, 
since the Electoral College might eventually decide the election outcome. 
These new rules would also encourage voter turnout by affording 
Americans the right to vote for President while leaving state legislatures 
with the right to appoint electors if their state’s voter turnout is too small.  
Conclusion 
The circumstances surrounding the creation of the Electoral College 
suggest that the Founding Fathers might have believed that new generations 
of Americans would propose a better election system or at least a better 
compromise in electing a President as the country developed. Such a com-
promise may be found in the proposed election rules under which nobody 
seems to lose while all voters and states gain.  
